FOREWORD
This paper examines a two-sided strategic nuclear exchange model Involving ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers and societal value on each aide. The first striker allocates his weapons against the second striker's weapons and value In such a way that, after massive retaliation by the second striker, the difference between the second striker's value destroyed and that of the first striker Is maximized. The paper presents computational results Including the sensitivities of the outcomes to various force characteristics,
The paper is a contribution to the literature In that It
Incorporates realistic weapon-on-weapon attrition functions into a formulation of the two-strike strategic exchange problem for which globally optimal allocations can be guaranteed. Among the approaches used in the past to answer this problem were the Strategic Weapons Exchange Models, reported in [1] and the Arsenal Exchange Model [2] . Neither of these models cou 1 d guarantee the globally optimal solution of the max-min problem they considered. Both incorporated Lagrangian solution procedures.
A branch-and-bound procedure was described by Bracken, Palk, and Miercort in [3] in which they constructed a piecewiselinear approximation to their original two-strike nuclear exchange model and found the global solution to the piecewiselinear model using an algorithm of Palk [5] . The Bracken, Falk, Chapter III
WEAPON-ON-WEAPON INTERACTIONS
This chapter develops formulae for attrition of Blue weapon resources resulting from a Red attack.
For the purposes of this paper, we will allow Red and Blue four weapon classes each. 1 The weapon classes, with their distinguishing characteristics, are as follows:
Class l--ICBMs. ICBMs are normally housed in silos, which are attacked individually. The locations of the silos are assumed to be known, and they may or may not be defended.
Class 2--SLBMs-AT-SEA. SLBMs-at-sea comprise those missiles on submarines that are patrolling on station. Our model permits these submarines to be attacked by strategic weapons, Submarines are attacked individually, the attacker is uncertain of their location, and they are not defended.
Class 3--B0MBERS. Bombers are attacked in groups, at airfields of known location, where they may or may not be defended.
(A "group" of weapons is a configuration such that an attack against any one of them is an attack against all of them.) Unlike missiles, bombers may be scrambled on warning and called back, if necessary. The model assumes five or fewer separate Blue airfields.
Class 4--SLBMS-IN-PENS. This class consists of SLBMs In submarines that are available for strategic retaliation but are in pens of known location. Thus, they must put to sea before they can retaliate effectively. All submarines at any given pen are attacked as a group and may or may not be defended. We allow for three or fewer Blue pens.
If Red attacks Blue, and there are four weapon classes on each side, then there Is a maximum of sixteen weapon-on-weapon
Interactions. However, because one wouM pay a p^l^c ±n prolonged run times if one were to allow all interactions, it is desirable to disallow, a priori, certain unlikely weapon-onweapon interactions. For instance, it is unlikely that Red bombers would be used against Blue ICBMs, since there would be sufficient warning before the bombers' arrival to launch all the ICBMs, thereby removing them as a target. All weapons may, of course, attack value targets.
We will assume that Red ICBMs and SLBMs-at-sea may attack any Blue weapon class. Red bombers, however, will only be effective against Blue SLBMs-in-pens, provided we assume that the latter require sufficient time to put to sea and so are vulnerable to bombers. Red SLBMs-in-pens may only attack value targets. These relationships are summarized in Figure 2 . 
A. SURVIVING BLUE ICBM WARHEADS
n : number of silos, p : probability of single shot kill of a silo due to a r» single attacking unit of class r, p : individual reliability of an attacking unit of class r, q : overall reliability of weapon class r; i.e., there is a probability 1-q that no weapons of class r will function, 0 : probability that an attacking unit of class r will r penetrate silo defenses.
W": number of warheads per missile,
x ,: number of attacking units of class r assigned to rl category "ICBMs."
We require that attacking units of any single type be uniformly distributed among the targets of a single category.
Therefore, the number of attacking units assigned to each silo is x ,/n . Then, the probability that an Individual silo survives an attack by weapon class r, provided weapon class r does not fail, is ^-P r o r P r j
Taking into account the probability that weapon class r might fail, the probability that a silo survives an attack by weapon class r is As with ICBMs, we assume that the number of class-r attack-3 ing units assigned to each submarine is x -/n . Considering only class-r attacking units, the probability that a single submarine will survive is 
K^)
Now, the probability that the submarine will survive an attack by Red weapon classes 1 and 2 Is
,(i-p r vl)
All the above assumes that the location of the submarine Is known. Considering the possibility that the submarine's location will not be acquired, the probability of submarine survival Is rrj: number of bombers at airfield n (n a l,...,5) (this may be 0 when there are fewer than 5 airfields). n n n : probability that a bomber will successfully n scramble from airfield n. B p : probability that a bomber at airfield n will be n * destroyed when airfield n is attacked by a single class-r attacking unit, p : individual reliability of a class-r attacking unit, q : overall reliability of weapon class r, g a : probability that a class-r attacking unit will ' penetrate the defenses of airfield n, ■ft Y : number of bombs per bomber at airfield n,
x ,: number of class-r weapons allocated to "bombers" r3 (r=l J 2).
We will require that attacking units be allocated proportionally to the number of bombers at each airfield, thus airfield n receives B / r B m n Wji m n weapons of class r. The probability that a bomber at airfield n survives a class-r attack, assuming no scramble and no overall failure of weapon class r, therefore is B / r B V 1^: -a n,r p n,rj n -
1
Including the probability of successful scramble, the probability of survival is B . , i B B ^ n B, /, B B \ m n ^3^^ % l n + (l-n n ) ^1-P r a njr p n}r j n-1
Recalling that the probability that weapon class r will fail as a c is a class is 1-q , the probability of survival of a single bomber As with bombers, pens will be attacked in proportion to the number of submarines in each. Thus, the number of class-r attacking units assigned to pen n is ^ WJ, m n '
n-l
If class r does not fall, the probability that a submarine in pen n will survive all class-r attacking units is
Including the overall reliability, the probability that a submarine will survive is P P \ / P P \ m n "rV ^ m n I j(l-q r ) +% (l-P r "n.r P", r ) ^"'l " iThus, the probability of the submarine sur/iving the full attack is HM ^ . /i P P \ m n ^4/1 m n | ^ j(l-q. r ) + V(l-Pr a n,r Pn,r) All x.., z,, E, s i t C , C > 0. Note that we have changed some equalities to Inequalities. This was done only to improve the efficiency of the computation. It is apparent by monotonicity that all Inequalities will be equalities at the optimal solution.
The next step is to place upper and lower bounds on all the variables. This can easily be done because the allocations on each side are bounded by the available resources. The bounds appear in Table 1 . In ordc " to save space in this table, we have occasionally employed the notation &{£,) and u(c) to denote the lower and upper bounds on variable ?> respectively.
Because the problem comprises only scalar functions cf bounded variables, and because these functions remain bounded over their domains, we can approximate these functions by plecowise-llnear functions in the following way.
Each function gCO in the separated problem is a function of a scalar variable for which we have lower and upper bounds Ü,(C), uU). We divide the Interval UU), uU)] into sublntervals determlred by the "cut points' t 0 , t l ,...,t k where t 0 = ÄU), t^ = u(c) and t 0 < t 1 < t 2 < ... < t . Then we compute g(t )
for i = 0,...,k and form the piecewlse-linear function
for t e t 1 , t i+1 1=0,...,k-1.
This process is depicted in Figure 3 .
The problem thus generated will be called the "piecewlselinear two-strike problem." Since all functions In the separated problem are con-cinuous, so are all the functions of the pieccwisellnear problem. Further, by taking enough cut points for each 
Figure 3. PIECEWISE-LINEAR APPROXIMATION
developed problems when applied to the model we have described above. A more stable code was developed by Grotte [6] and was the code used in the runs described below.
i : f
Chapter VI r.ESULTS
The piecewlse-linear model was run on a CDC 6^00 computer.
For all runs, upper and lower bounds were computed as described above and eight cut points per variable were chosen as follows.
Noting that all functions g(i;) in the separated two-strike model had derivatives that were largest in absolute value for small 5J and that decreased in absolute value as ^ increased, Wc felt that small intervals for small ?, and large intervals for large £;, should be used for constructing + .he piecewise-linear approximating function g(c)' Therefore, £(?) and u(c) were computed first, r = u(0 -(c)/ 127 was then calculated, and the cut points for C were chosen to be
In this way, each subinterval was twice the length of the one preceding it, ensuring that there would be small subintervals at the low end of the interval [£(*;)> u(?)] and larger subintervals at the high end. In practice, this procedure produced better results than using many more intervals of uniform length.
Our investigation of the responses of the model begins with a base case set of parameters. These are listed in Table 2 . A number of series of runs were performed in each of which a specific subset of parameters was varied in a systematic fashion. Certain model outputs wer 3 then graphed to demonstrate the sensitivity of the model to parameter changes. These are discussed below.
Each run took between 100 and 200 seconds of CPU time. 
D. SERIES 4--CHANGES IN BLUE BOMBER SCRAMBLE PROBABILITIES
This series tests the effect of varying the Blue Bomber scramble probabilities. The variation was effected by assigning the values 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9, one at a time, R R B B B jointly to n-T» n?, H-^, n,),, and ric-The damage curves appear in Figure 9« The result is that, as all the n* increase Red is not induced to change his attack, but Blue can inflict greater retaliatory damage owing to his improved bomber survivability. 
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